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ARTICLE
OUR EXPERIENCE UNDER THE NATURAL GAS
POLICY ACT OF 1978, AND ITS RELEVANCE
TO THE NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD
DECONTROL ACT OF 1989
Steven M. Spaeth*
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of natural gas wellhead regulation has been marked
by conceptual and practical difficulties, both under the Federal Power
Commission ("FPC" or "Commission") and under its successor the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC" or "Commis-
sion").' The market distortions in the natural gas market resulting
from wellhead regulation have been widely discussed.2 Most com-
mentators have been severely critical of the effects of wellhead price
regulation on the natural gas industry. Nevertheless, Congress re-
cently enacted deregulatory legislation that tends to perpetuate these
effects.
* B.S. Econ., Eastern Michigan University; J.D., Northwestern University. Currently
Staff Attorney, Tariff Division, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Washington, D.C.
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Commission.
The author would like to thank Professor Jordan Jay Hillman of Northwestern University for
his helpful comments during the early stages of this article and his continued valued
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1. Cormie, Incremental Pricing Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 57 DEN. L.J. 1
(1979); Crnmp, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses. A Legal and Economic Analysis, 70
MINN. L. REV. 61 (1985); Harrison and Formby, Regional Distortions in Natural Gas Alloca-
tions: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 57 N.C.L. REV. 57 (1978); MacAvoy, The Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 811 (1979); Morgan and Patterson, The Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of Practice and Two to Make Perfect, 71 Ky. L.J. 105
(1982); Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63
(1982); Ringleb, Natural Gas Producer Price Regulation Under the NGPA: Regulatory Failure,
Alternatives, and Reform, 20 Hous. L. REV. 709 (1983); Shoneman and McConnell, FERC
Order No. 451: Freedom (Almost) For Old Gas, 7 ENERGY L.J. 299 (1986).
2. Crump, supra note 1, at 70; Harrison and Formby, supra note 1, at 63-67; MacAvoy,
supra note 1, at 813-14; Morgan and Patterson, supra note 1, at 140-47; Ringleb, supra note 1,
at 714-16.
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Wellhead price regulation began in 1954 when the Supreme
Court ordered the FPC to exercise jurisdiction over natural gas pro-
ducers.' After the FPC struggled for twenty-four years to develop
workable wellhead regulation, Congress passed the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act of 1978 (NGPA).4 The NGPA created several different cate-
gories of natural gas' and the act gradually deregulated most, but not
all, of these categories between 1978 and 1985.6 Congress hoped the
NGPA would correct the existing problems of wellhead price regula-
tion without placing too much of the burden of increased natural gas
prices on residential consumers.' Shortly after the enactment of the
NGPA, commentators criticized Congress' deregulation of wellhead
prices as much as they criticized wellhead price regulation itself. The
commentators were convinced that the complex system established by
the NGPA would create more problems for the natural gas market
than it solved.8
Recently, Congress passed the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol
Act of 1989 (Decontrol Act)9 to deregulate the categories of gas left
untouched by the NGPA. Past experience with the NGPA may be
helpful in evaluating the new deregulatory law and its possible effects
on gas producers and consumers. Section II of this article reviews the
history of natural gas regulation prior to 1978 and the effect of regula-
tion on the gas market. Section III examines the NGPA in detail, and
Section IV considers the criticisms leveled against the NGPA at the
time of its enactment. Section V discusses the commentators' criti-
cisms and the accuracy of their accompanying predictions. Finally,
Section VI discusses the Decontrol Act, and Section VII sets out con-
clusions regarding the possible effects of the Decontrol Act on the gas
market.
II. NATURAL GAS REGULATION BEFORE 1978
The natural gas industry is somewhat fragmented. Each step of
the process of getting the gas from the ground to the consumer is
performed in a separate, distinct market.' I The market in which gas
3. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3320 (1988).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3332 (1988).
7. H.R. REP. No. 5289, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1978); MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 824.
8. Cormie, supra note 1, at 19-20; MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 828; Morgan and Patter-
son, supra note 1, at 105-07; Pierce, supra note 1, at 114-15; Ringleb, supra note 1, at 768-69.
9. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
10. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, ENERGY LAW 489 (1983).
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well operators sell to pipelines is called the "wellhead market.""
There are usually hundreds of gas producers in any field, ranging
from large integrated or independent producers who operate a large
portion of the field to "wildcatters" who operate only a small number
of wells. 12 As a result, the wellhead market is usually very competi-
tive.13 The pipelines transport the gas from the fields to the point or
measuring station where it is sold to and received by local distribu-
tors. The market where the pipelines sell the gas to local distributors
is called the "city gate market." Pipelines have declining marginal
costs, and usually only one pipeline serves a city. Therefore, pipelines
are considered natural monopolies,"' and it is generally agreed that
they must be regulated.' 5 The market between the local distributors
and the final consumers is called the "burner-tip market," and this
market is also considered a natural monopoly. 6 While state public
service commissions regulate the burner-tip market, the other gas
markets fall under federal jurisdiction."' This article will focus on
federal gas regulation.
In 1923 the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co.' 8 that state agencies could not regulate interstate pipelines
without unconstitutionally restricting interstate commerce.19 Con-
gress enacted the Natural Gas Act (NGA) 2° in 1938 to fill the regula-
tory gap created when natural gas pipelines began to expand across
state boundaries. The NGA gave the FPC jurisdiction over all "natu-
ral-gas compan[ies]. ' ' 21 This Act defined a natural-gas company as "a
person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate com-
merce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale." '22
While the NGA gave the FPC the power to set rates for the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas
Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347 (1983).
14. Pierce, supra note 13, at 352; L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, FREE ENTER-
PRISE AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 31 (1985).
15. L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, supra note 14, at 31. But see Pierce, supra note
13 (arguing that the pipeline industry has become competitive in many city gate markets and
should be deregulated).
16. L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, supra note 14. at 31.
17. Id.
18. 265 U.S. 298 (1923).
19. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 490-92; Morgan and Patterson, supra
note 1, at 107-08; Ringleb, supra note 1, at 713.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1988).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1988).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1988).
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transportation and resale of natural gas, it specifically excluded "the
production or gathering of natural gas" from the Commission's juris-
diction.23 Since gas producers and gatherers sell gas in interstate
commerce for resale, these two clauses created an ambiguity in the
NGA.24 The FPC tried to resolve this ambiguity in the Phillips Petro-
leum Co. rate hearing.25 Phillips produced and gathered gas but did
26not engage in interstate transportation of gas to consumers. The
FPC construed its jurisdiction under the NGA as not extending to
Phillips.27 The Commission based this construction of the NGA on
the legislative history of the NGA, focusing particularly on a 1935
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report requested by Congress con-
cerning the natural gas industry. 28 The FTC found that producers
had no monopoly power but rather were victimized by the monopoly
power of pipelines in the wellhead market. 29 However, in Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Wisconsin ,3 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
a lower court holding which overturned the Commission's finding. In
construing the legislative history of the NGA, the Court found that
Congress only intended the NGA to "plug the 'gap' " left by Missouri
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. and did not intend to leave wellhead prices
unregulated. 3' Therefore, the Court held that Phillips was a natural
gas company for purposes of the NGA and required the FPC to regu-
late wellhead gas prices.
3 2
Prior to the Phillips Petroleum Co. V Wisconsin decision in 1954,
the FPC had gained a great deal of experience with rate of return
regulation in regulating pipelines. Therefore, the Commission chose
to use rate of return regulation to comply with Phillips, even though
this form of regulation is not particularly suitable for competitive in-
dustries like gas production.33 In fact, rate of return regulation soon
23. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
24. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 714; Pierce, supra note 1, at 66.
25. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
26. Id. at 249; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 675 (1954). Phillips did
transport gas across state lines from its fields to its processing plants. Id.
27. 10 F.P.C. at 276.
28. Id. at 261-76 (citing REPORT OF THE FTC TO THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 92,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 132-33, 590-91 (1928-36)).
29. REPORT OF THE FTC TO THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
132-33, 590-91 (1928-36); 10 F.P.C. at 263.
30. 347 U.S: 672 (1954).
31. Id. at 682-84.
32. Id. at 677.
33. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 511; Morgan and Patterson, supra
note 1, at 109.
"Rate of return" regulation is the traditional method of regulating natural monopolies.
[Vol. 12:265
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became unworkable due to the massive increase in workload which
burdened the FPC. Before Phillips increased the Commission's juris-
diction, the FPC processed an average of 700 gas rate filings per
year.34 After Phillips the Commission was expected to process over
11,000 filings annually.35 In 1955 Congress attempted to relieve the
FPC of this burden by specifically exempting producers and gatherers
from regulation. However, President Eisenhower vetoed the bill in
the face of allegations that a gas industry lobbyist offered a bribe to a
legislator. 36 This forced the FPC to find another way to deal with the
overwhelming problem imposed on it by the Supreme Court.
In 1960 the FPC attempted to deal with the problems created by
Phillips by establishing uniform rates for all producers in one area of
the country based on average costs of production in those areas.3 7 It
was under this "area rate" method that the FPC introduced "vintag-
ing" to wellhead regulation. "Vintaging" refers to the allowance of a
higher rate for gas produced from wells drilled after a certain date,
which in this case was January 1, 1961. New gas is more expensive
than old gas because of geological survey costs and costs resulting
from wells which turn out to be dry.39 Therefore, the Commission
felt that basing wellhead price ceilings on historical costs would dis-
Under this method, the monopoly is guaranteed recoupment of its investment, plus a fair rate
of return. Rate of return regulation has one obvious inefficiency in that it removes all incen-
tives for the monopoly to improve its quality of service. Regulators continue to use rate of
return regulation because subjecting consumers to this inefficiency is preferable to subjecting
them to unrestrained monopoly power. However, in markets in which prices are controlled by
competitive pressures, there is no good reason to impose the inefficiency of rate of return regu-
lation.
For a more complete discussion of natural monopolies and rate of return regulation, see J.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1961); A. KAHN, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF REGULATION (1970); L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, supra note 14, at 68-71; W.
BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, 497-503 (1982). For a dis-
cussion focusing on the inefficiency of rate of return regulation and a recently developed alter-
native, see Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Common Carriers, 4 FCC Rcd.
2783 (1989); J. HILLMAN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1989). For a discussion of the inappropriateness of rate of return regula-
tion to the wellhead market, see FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944)
(separate opinion of Jackson, J.).
34. Harrison and Formby, supra note 1, at 65.
35. Id. It was estimated that, if the Commission's staff was tripled, it would still take 83
years to get through the backlog. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 511.
36. Crump, supra note 1, at 70.
37. Area Rate Proceedings, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960), 34 F.P.C. 159-168 (1965). For more on
area rates, see D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 511; Morgan and Patterson,
supra note 1, at 110.
38. Area Rate Proceedings, 34 F.P.C. 185-88. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note
10, at 511; Harrison and Formby, supra note 1, at 66.
39. 34 F.P.C. 192-93.
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courage exploration, but they also felt that vintaging would counter-
act this effect without giving a windfall to owners of old gas wells.'
However, the Commission did not develop area rates for the first area
until 1965, and these rates did not take effect for another three years
while the area rate method was withstanding court challenges.4 Con-
sequently, the area rates were based on costs that were outdated and
unrealistically low by the time the rates were enacted.42
The area rates contributed in several ways to the severe gas
shortages of the early 1970s. First, the vintage price for new gas was
not high enough to encourage exploration for new gas supplies.43 Sec-
ond, the rates caused the diversion of existing gas supplies from the
interstate market to the intrastate market where the FPC did not have
jurisdiction and where producers were allowed to charge market
rates.' Finally, the low vintaged prices encouraged industrial users
to switch from coal or fuel oil to natural gas for boiler fuel, which
resulted in abnormally high industrial gas demand.45 The FPC re-
sponded to these problems in 1974 by setting national rates,46 which
introduced more vintaging to its pricing structure4 7 and used future
cost projections to set rates.48 However, the national rates were still
not high enough to encourage new exploration and, consequently, the
gas shortage grew worse as the 1970s progressed.49
III. THE NGPA
Natural gas was persistently in short supply throughout the
1970s, largely because of wellhead price regulation and the 1973
OPEC oil embargo.5" Because of these shortages, and after more than
a year of debate, Congress enacted the NGPA.5' The NGPA was
intended to raise natural gas rates to market clearing levels. Congress
40. Id. at 185-88; Harrison and Formby, supra note 1, at 66.
41. The Supreme Court held the area rate method constitutional in the Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
42. Pierce, supra note 1, at 67.
43. Id. at 69; D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 516.
44. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 499; Morgan and Patterson, supra
note 1, at 112.
45. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 516; Harrison and Formby, supra note
1, at 67-68.
46. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974).
47. Id. at 2215; Cormie, supra note 1, at 2-3.
48. 51 F.P.C. at 2245; Pierce, supra note 1, at 68.
49. Pierce, supra note 1, at 69.
50. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTrMAN, supra note 10, at 516.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432. For an excellent summary of the Congressional debate, see
Morgan and Patterson, supra note 1, at 114-16.
270 [Vol. 12:265
NATURAL GAS
hoped this would encourage exploration, correct the disparity be-
tween the interstate and intrastate markets, and make other fuels
competitive with natural gas. However, Congress also sought to
avoid placing most of the brunt of the price increases on residential
consumers. 52
The NGPA created over thirty classifications of natural gas.
These classifications fall into three general groups: high-cost gas, new
gas, and old gas.5 3 The Act defined "high-cost gas" as gas from a new
well deeper than 15,000 feet, gas from geopressurized brine, occluded
gas from coal seams, or gas from Devonian shale.54 The Act deregu-
lated high-cost gas as of November 1979.55 Analysts project that
high-cost gas will make up only 5% of known gas reserves by 1990.56
The Act defined new gas roughly as gas produced from Outer
Continental Shelf leases established after April 20, 1977,17 and from
onshore wells drilled after February 19, 1977, which are two and a
half miles away from a marker well.58 A "marker well" is a well
which was producing gas in commercial quantities between January
1, 1970, and April 20, 1977. Congress did not want to classify wells
drilled within 2.5 miles of a marker well as new gas wells,59 presuma-
bly because the risks associated with drilling near an established well
are much lower than the risks associated with drilling the first well in
a field. The Act provided for monthly increases in the price ceilings
for most new gas at a rate 3.5% above inflation before April 1981, and
at a rate of 4% above inflation from April 1981 to December 1984,
and then the Act deregulated most new gas prices entirely on January
1, 1985.60 New gas from onshore wells less than 5000 feet in depth
was to be regulated until July 1, 1987,61 and gas from Prudhoe Bay in
Alaska and some intrastate gas was to be regulated indefinitely.6 2 In
1978, new gas made up about one-half of known gas reserves.63
52. MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 812.
53. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 737.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(1)-(4) (1988).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(b) (1988); Ringleb, supra note 1, at 737.
56. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 738.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(A) (1988); 18 C.F.R. § 271.203(d) (1989).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(B) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (1988); Cormie,
supra note 1, at 3.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1978). The legislative history does
not explain why two and one-half miles was used.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (1988); Ringleb, supra note 1, at 719 n.43.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(c) (1988).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(d), (e) (1988).
63. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 738.
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The' NGPA defined "old gas" as gas dedicated' to interstate
commerce before November 8, 1978.65 Under the Act, old gas contin-
ued to be regulated indefinitely by the area and national rates estab-
lished under the NGA66 with rate-adjustments for inflation 67 based
upon the GNP implicit price deflator plus 0.2%.68 Congress chose
this method because the market basket for the Consumer Price Index
was about to be revised at that time and because, historically, the CPI
ran about 0.2% higher than the implicit price deflator.69 Old gas was
expected to constitute about one-half of known gas reserves in 1985,
but most of these reserves were expected to be depleted fairly
quickly.70 As old gas reserves were depleted, the proportion of regu-
lated wellhead prices was expected to decrease over time, providing a
smooth transition to complete decontrol.7 '
The reason for deregulating only high-cost and new gas was the
same as the reason for vintaging under the area and national rates; the
risk of drilling a dry well makes high-cost and new wells much cost-
lier than old wells.7 2 Therefore, once a well is producing, rates only
need to cover the operating costs to keep the well in operation because
the risk is greatly reduced. However, rates must be higher on new
wells in order to encourage exploration.73 The NGPA's classification
system was meant to encourage exploration to find new supplies while
keeping the price of old gas low in order to prevent producers from
receiving a windfall.74
In order to make other fuels competitive with natural gas, Con-
gress included "incremental pricing" provisions in the NGPA. 75 In-
stead of averaging the rates of all gases together, or "rolling in" prices
64. Gas is "dedicated" to a market when the FPC or FERC has granted the natural gas
company a certificate of convenience and necessity under § 7 of the NGA, giving the company
permission to sell gas in either the interstate or intrastate market. 15 U.S.C. § 717g (1988).
For more on the dedication of gas, see D. ZILLMAN & L. LATrMAN, supra note 10, at 500-08.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 3314(a) (1988).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 3314(b)(2)(B) (1988).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 3314(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988).
68. Id.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 72-74 (1978).
70. Pierce, supra note 1, at 89.
71. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 740.
72. See supra notes 38-40, and accompanying text; Ringleb, supra note 1, at 731.
73. Cormie, supra note 1, at 4.
74. Id.; Ringleb, supra note 1, at 731.
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (1982). The incremental pricing provisions of the NGPA
were repealed by an amendment to the Industrial Fuel Use Act. Pub. L. No. 100-42, § 2(a);
101 Stat. 310, 314 (1987). However, rules promulgated under the authority of the incremental
pricing provisions were to continue in effect with respect to the flow-through of costs incurred
prior to the enactment of this amendment.
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for all consumers, as was commonly done before 1978,76 the NGPA
called for the direct pass-through of certain costs to large industrial
consumers. 77 These pass-through costs were the acquisition costs of
new natural gas exceeding $1.48 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) in
March 1978, adjusted for inflation, the acquisition costs of natural gas
imports and stripper well gas that are greater than the new gas price,
and the acquisition costs of high-cost gas that exceeds the price of No.
2 fuel oil by 130%.78 The Act provided for the pass-through to con-
tinue until either gas rates were decontrolled in 1985 or until the gas
rates paid by consumers were equivalent to the price of No. 2 fuel oil
in that consumer's region of the country on a Btu basis. 79 This provi-
sion was intended to force industrial users to bear more of the price
increases than residential users.
Finally, the NGPA applied the interstate price ceilings for new
gas to the previously unregulated intrastate market.8 ° For intrastate
gas priced less than the NGPA new gas price ceiling prior to Novem-
ber 8, 1978, the Act set the price at the lower of either the contract
price or the new gas price."1 For intrastate gas priced higher than the
new gas price on this date, the price was set at the higher of the two.82
Congress intended this provision to limit the operation of escalation
clauses to the monthly increases in the NGPA interstate new gas
price ceilings. 83 Also, the NGPA gave the FPC power to authorize
intrastate pipelines to sell gas in interstate commerce, as long as the
rates are just and reasonable within the meaning of the NGA. This
provision encouraged expansion of interstate supplies.8 4
IV. EXPECTED PROBLEMS WITH THE NGPA
The commentators who examined the NGPA gave it almost uni-
versally negative reviews. Many criticized it for being too compli-
cated and difficult to administer.85 Some thought that the ceilings for
old gas would discourage production by forcing the early abandon-
76. Cormie, supra note 1, at 3.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 3341(b) (1988). D. ZILLMAN & L. LATrMAN, supra note 10, at 520-21.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 3343 (1988).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 3344(e)(1) (1988).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 3315(b)(1) (1988). See also D. ZILLMAN & L. LATrMAN, supra note 10,
at 499.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 3315(b)(1) (1988).
82. Id.; Morgan and Patterson, supra note 1, at 122.
83. H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 82-83 (1978).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 3371(b)(1) (1988); D. ZILLMAN & L. LATrMAN, supra note 10, at 517.
85. Cormie, supra note 1, at 14-15.
1989-90]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
ment of stripper wells8 6 and by discouraging research for new meth-
ods of increasing production from very old wells.8 7 Others noted that
the NGPA mandated another seven years of price distortion by delay-
ing the time when gas prices would be equivalent to oil prices until
1985.
The price ceilings were designed to bring gas prices into parity
with oil prices by 1985. When the NGPA was enacted in 1978, this
price was expected to be about $12 to $14 per barrel, but in 1979, oil
prices jumped to $30 per barrel.8 9 This led commentators to conclude
that gas prices would double almost overnight when the ceilings were
removed.90 In addition, many commentators feared that the incre-
mental pricing provisions of the NGPA, designed to foster efficient
economic decisions by industrial consumers, would hurt residential
consumers. These writers feared that encouraging industrial consum-
ers to switch to other fuels would force residential consumers to pay
for more than their fair share of the fixed costs of the pipelines.9
There were also many doubts as to whether the NGPA would
correct the disparity between the intrastate and interstate gas mar-
kets. One commentator noted that even though the NGPA gave in-
terstate pipelines access to intrastate gas supplies, intrastate pipelines
were not given similar access to interstate supplies.9 2 Because of this,
the author feared that gas supplies might be diverted to interstate con-
sumers whether or not these consumers had a higher valued use for
the gas than the intrastate consumers.9 3 Morgan and Patterson con-
tended that the NGPA might cause shortages in the intrastate mar-
ket.94 These authors assumed that the NGPA would merely lock old
intrastate and old interstate prices at pre-NGPA levels. 95 Since gas
dedicated to interstate pipelines was priced lower than intrastate gas,
interstate pipelines were expected to have a larger "cushion" than in-
trastate pipelines. This would enable them to bid more for new gas
supplies.96 Consequently, the interstate pipelines would have an ad-
vantage over intrastate pipelines in bidding for newly developed gas
86. Pierce, supra note 1, at 90-91.
87. Id., at 91-92.
88. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 742.
89. D. ZILLMAN & L. LATTMAN, supra note 10, at 520-21.
90. Id.
91. Cormie, supra note 1, at 14.
92. Ringleb, supra note 1, at 755-57 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 3371(b)(1) (1988)).
93. Id. at 756.





supplies because the "rolling in" of the old gas rates allows them to
bid more for new supplies.97
Morgan and Patterson felt that this problem would be exacer-
bated by the problem of "fly-up," a problem which also concerned
many other writers.98 These other writers theorized that "fly-up"
would result from the interaction of long-term natural gas contracts
subject to burner-tip price regulation with the partial decontrol of
wellhead prices. Since pipelines prefer reliable, long-term gas sup-
plies, most gas supply contracts last for decades.99 These contracts
usually contain provisions dealing with the possibility of fluctuating
gas prices during the life of the contract."1  One of the most popular
pricing provisions is the "favored nation" clause. 1 ' Under a favored
nation clause, a pipeline agrees either to pay the producer the highest
rate it pays to any other producer or to pay the highest rate any pipe-
line company agrees to pay to any producer in a given area.12
Burner-tip prices play a role in this predicted "fly-up" because
they are divided into a demand component and into a commodity
component. 0 3 The demand component is based on the customer's
peak demand and is fixed for each customer. 104 The commodity com-
ponent is based on the customer's actual gas usage and varies with the
amount of gas consumed.10 5 Burner-tip rates are set so that 75% of
the pipeline's fixed costs are recovered by the commodity component
and 25% by the demand component when the pipeline sells a certain
amount of gas.106 However, since the commodity charge is not re-
duced after these fixed costs have been met, this creates an incentive
for the pipeline to sell as much gas as it can at current prices. The
commodity charge of any gas sold above the expected amount greatly
97. Id. "Rolling in" refers to the averaging of natural gas rates transported in a pipeline
at the same time. See text accompanying note 76, supra.
98. Morgan and Patterson, supra note 1, at 143; Pierce, supra note 1, at 96-99; Ringleb,
supra note 1, at 747-50.
99. Crump, supra note 1, at 63; Pierce, supra note 1, at 77.
100. Crump, supra note 1, at 63-64; Pierce, supra note 1, at 78.
101. Crump, supra note 1, at 65; Pierce, supra note 1, at 80-81.
102. Crump, supra note i, at 65-66; Pierce, supra note 1, at 80-81. Professors Crump and
Pierce noted that, according to a study of long term natural gas prices sponsored by the Amer-
ican Gas Association, 83% of all old interstate gas contracts have some kind of favored nation
clause, but the study did not show the relative popularity of both forms of favored nation
clauses, nor did it reveal when either form was more likely to be used. Pierce, supra note 1, at
81 n.70.
103. Pierce, supra note 1, at 84.
104. Id. at 83.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 84 n.84.
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increases the profits of the pipeline. Therefore, the pipeline would be
willing to pay more than the burner-tip price for extra gas supplies





The interaction of favored nation clauses and burner-tip rates
with partial decontrol of wellhead prices may be illustrated with a
numerical example.10 8 Assume a pipeline gets 50% of its supplies
from old gas sources and it gets 50% of its supplies from new gas
sources. Assume also that the price ceiling on old gas is $2 per Mcf
and the consumers in the burner-tip market are willing to pay $5 per
Mcf. Finally, assume that the pipeline is currently in short supply. In
this case, the pipeline would be willing to pay up to $8 per Mcf for
new gas supplies. This is because the $8 price would be averaged with
the $2 price and yield $5 as a final price. In addition, the commodity
component of any additional gas sales would make the $8 price profit-
able to the pipeline. This $8 price would trigger the favored nation
clauses of other contracts, causing gas prices to skyrocket.
In summary, many commentators expected the NGPA to be det-
rimental to consumer interest because of "fly-up" and because of
shortages caused by the premature abandonment of old wells. These
writers also thought the NGPA would shift pipeline costs from indus-
trial to residential consumers. They expected the political reaction to
this to be so severe that Congress would be forced to either postpone
the date when price ceilings would be lifted completely from new gas
or to enact new regulatory legislation in 1985.109
V. ACTUAL RESULTS UNDER THE NGPA
In almost all respects, the NGPA did exactly what Congress in-
tended it to do. For example, the NGPA encouraged new produc-
tion. Exploratory gas well completions increased from 1560 in 1977
to 2550 in 1981.110 Additions to gas reserves as a proportion of pro-
duction increased from an average of 46% for the eleven years prior
to the passage of the NGPA to an average of over 90% for the seven
years after the NGPA. 1 ' Therefore, the gas industry had replaced
107. Id. at 84-85.
108. This example was first used by Pierce, supra note 1, at 96-97.
109. Cormie, supra note 1, at 17-19; MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 822, 828; Morgan and
Patterson, supra note 1, at 160.
110. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 at 22,174 (1986).
111. Reif, Natural Gas Today and Tomorrow, 116 PUB. UTIL. FORT. Oct. 17, 1985, at 15.
The article does not specify whether or not these are compounded percentages.
276 [Vol. 12:265
NATURAL GAS
almost all the gas consumed in this country.' 12
The gas market also became more competitive due to the devel-
opment of a spot market."I3 In 1984 over two billion Mcf were traded
on the spot market.' 14 In addition, brokerage firms started to facili-
tate the operation of the spot market by soliciting buy-sell orders, ar-
ranging transportation, standardizing transactions, and providing
financing and storage services.' This ordinarily decreases the
amount of time required for spot gas prices to move to market clear-
ing levels.
Also, the elimination of market distinctions and the release of
market forces did not result in the projected negative results. The
disparity between the interstate and intrastate markets was practically
eliminated." 6 Apparently the cessation of the different regulatory
treatment of the two markets allowed market forces to bring them
into equilibrium with each other. Likewise, the anticipated "fly-up"
problem did not materialize. The average wellhead price of new gas
fell from $3.78 per Mcf in January 1985 to $3.33 per Mcf in Decem-
ber 1985.117 The decline in gas rates from 1984 to 1988 was 14% for
residential consumers, 16% for commercial consumers, and 26% for
industrial consumers and utility companies.1 18 Again, the release of
market forces apparently allowed the increase in supply to prevent
any excessive increases in price.
However, the natural gas market did not function perfectly after
the NGPA nor did all the criticisms directed at the NGPA turn out
to be unfounded. Although gas supplies increased in response to
higher prices, the increases came mainly from new and high-cost
sources." 9 As FERC pointed out:
As of March, 1986, the average cost of new and high-cost gas was
$3.38 per Mcf, while the Energy Information Administration esti-
mates over 11 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) of additional old gas could be
recovered at $2.57 per MMBtu (million Btu). Thus, valuable sup-
112. Id.
113. The "spot market" is a market for gas sold under contracts of one year duration or
less. See Cochran and DeNero, Capitalizing on the Buyers Market for Natural Gas, 116 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. Oct. 3, 1985, at 34, 36.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Shoneman & McConnell, supra note 1, at 302-03.
117. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,175 (1986). See also 135 CONG. REC.
H1262 (daily ed., Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Sharp); id. at H1265 (statement of Rep.
Fields).
118. 135 CONG. REC. H1262 (daily ed., Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
119. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,172 (1986).
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plies of inexpensive old gas are being inadequately developed or
prematurely abandoned, while investment capital is being inef-
ficiently allocated to more expensive supplies of new gas.' 2°
Since old gas prices did not cover the cost of developing replacement
reserves, producers were leaving their old gas in the ground in favor
of more expensive sources of gas. 2 '
In addition, pipelines became obligated to buy these new, rela-,
tively expensive supplies because of "take or pay" contracts they
formed during the shortages of the 1970s. 122 These take or pay con-
tracts obligated pipelines to pay for a certain amount of gas, regard-
less of the amount of gas actually taken. 23  After the pipelines
obligated themselves to these contracts, gas demand decreased in re-
sponse to several factors, including higher prices, a decrease in oil
prices, a recession in the economy as a whole, and warmer than aver-
age weather during the early 1980s. 124 Consequently, pipelines accu-
mulated an excess of gas at prices too high to sell. In spite of this
surplus, consumers still faced steady or increasing prices caused by a
decreasing customer base as a result of industrial consumers switching
to alternative fuels.'25 This surplus has come to be known as the
"bubble."
The bubble caused difficulties not only for residential consumers
but for many producers as well. In spite of excess pipeline capac-
ity, 126 pipelines were forced to refuse to transport lower priced gas
from some producers because of their take or pay obligations.' 27 This
untransported gas is referred to as being "shut in," and having their
gas shut in put a financial strain on these producers.
128
FERC tried to solve the bubble problem by altering the way it set
rates for old gas under its NGA jurisdiction.2 9 First, the Commis-
sion noted that the NGPA incorporates the "just and reasonable"
price ceilings for old gas established under the NGA. 3 ° The Com-
120. Id. One MMBtu is roughly equivalent to one Mcf. See also 135 CONG. REC. H1263
(daily ed., Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
121. Id.
122. Shoneman & McConnell, supra note 1, at 302; White, The Right to Recover Royalties
on Natural Gas Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 677 (1988).
123. H.R. REP. No. 814, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984).
124. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,174 (1986).
125. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,175 (1986).
126. Id.
127. H.R. REP. No. 814, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1984).
128. Shoneman & McConnell, supra note 1, at 302.
129. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 3431 (1978).
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mission also argued that factors other than original costs could be
considered in setting "just and reasonable" rates' as long as the rates
fell within "a zone of reasonableness" as required by FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co. 13 2 The Commission concluded that it could consider
replacement costs in setting rates that were "just and reasonable" for
purposes of the NGA. 133 Next, the Commission discarded all of the
various price ceilings on different vintages of old gas that were left
over from the area and national rates and replaced them with a uni-
form $2.57 per MMBtu, the ceiling price for post-1974 old gas.1 34 Fi-
nally, the Commission established a procedure for "good faith
negotiation" under which pipelines and producers would be allowed
to renegotiate their gas contracts one time within a two-year pe-
riod.1 35  By raising the price of old gas, FERC successfully en-
couraged the release of less expensive gas into the marketplace.
The size of the bubble is now decreasing and is expected to be
gone in a year or two. 136  Furthermore, gas prices are fluctuating
properly in response to changes in oil prices'3 7 and appear to be fluc-
tuating properly in response to changes in gas supply and demand. 3 8
131. FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 397-99 (1974) (market price is one criterion which can
be used in setting reasonable prices if other criteria are also considered). See also City of
Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
132. 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944).
133. 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,170-71 (1986).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 22,169. See also Johnson, Order No. 451-Market-Based Pricing for "Old" Gas,
24 TULSA L.J. 627, 633 (1989). Prior to Order No. 451, FERC issued Order No. 436, which
mandated nondiscriminatory open access for transportation of gas supplies and a simplifica-
tion of the formerly very complex procedures for abandonment of contract obligations for a
specified period of time. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,409-10 (1985). Even though the D.C. Circuit
supported Order No. 436, it remanded the Order because among other things, FERC failed to
adequately explain why it did not eliminate take-or-pay contracts altogether. Associated Gas
Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For more on Order No. 436 and the
Associated Gas Distributors case, see Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Market from Well-
head to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 24-27, 35-36 (1988).
In response, FERC issued Order No. 500 which allowed pipelines to pass through some,
but not all, of the costs of settling take-or-pay obligations and set up guidelines for avoiding
take-or-pay problems in the future. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987). Senator Bradley of New
Jersey proposed an amendment to the Wellhead Decontrol Act to give FERC explicit statu-
tory authority to require open access transportation, 135 CONG. REC. S6577 (daily ed. June 14,
1989) (statement of Sen. Bradley), but this amendment was tabled. 135 CONG. REC. S6592
(daily ed. June 14, 1989). Since Congress has chosen not to deal with take-or-pay issues in the
Wellhead Decontrol Act, these issues are beyond the scope of this article.
136. Arndt, Gas Bubble Days May Be Numbered, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 7, 1988, § 7, at 1,
col. 2.
137. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, § IV, at 28, col. 2.
138. See Arndt, supra note 136 (describing movements in gas supply, demand, and prices
since 1985). Of course, one can never know whether prices are reacting to or driving changes
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Therefore, current FERC policies seem to be working.
VI. THE NATURAL GAS DECONTROL ACT OF 1989
On July 26, 1989, Congress enacted the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act of 1989 (Decontrol Act). 3 9 The Decontrol Act elimi-
nates wellhead price controls from wells drilled after March 23, 1989,
and from wells not under contractual obligation on the day of enact-
ment." The Decontrol Act also decontrols gas under contractual
obligation when the contract expires or is renegotiated.14" ' Any gas
still under regulation on January 1, 1993, will be deregulated on that
date. 142 Finally, the Decontrol Act continues to regulate wells drilled
after March 23, 1989, or "newly spudded wells," until May 15, 1991.
Congress chose May 15, 1991, as the decontrol date for newly spud-
ded wells as the result of a political compromise. 43 The Senate ver-
sion of the Act would have controlled rates on newly spudded wells
until January 1, 1993, while the House version would have deregu-
lated newly spudded wells immediately.'"
In 1988, roughly 39% of flowing natural gas was subject to some
price ceiling.' 45 The House bill proposed deregulation of about 25%
of this gas immediately and about 50% within a year of enactment.
4 6
in supply and demand. However, because most gas prices have been allowed to move freely
since 1985, it is reasonable to conclude that prices are reacting to supply and demand in this
case.
139. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
140. H.R. REP. No. 29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989). See also 135 CONG. REC. H1262
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
141. H.R. REP. No. 29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989). See also 135 CONG. REC. H1262
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
142. H.R. REP. No. 29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989). See also 135 CONG. REC. H1262
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
143. H.R. REP. No. 100, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. S6634 (daily
ed. June 14, 1989); 135 CONG. REC. H2598 (daily ed. June 15, 1989).
144. For a discussion of the House bill, see H.R. REP. No. 1722, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989), 135 CONG. REC. H1260-61, H1267 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989); H.R. REP. No. 29, 101st
Cong.; 1st Sess. (1989); Rosewicz, House Passes Bill to Decontrol Prices for Gas, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 18, 1989, at A28, col. 4. For a discussion of the Senate bill and a comparison of the two
bills, see H.R. REP. No. 100, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. S6594 (daily
ed. June 14, 1989); 135 CONG. REC. H2998-99 (daily ed. June 22, 1989); 135 CONG. REC.
S7214-16 (daily ed. June 22, 1989); 135 CONG. REC. S3920 (daily ed. April 13, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Nichols); Gutfeld, Senate Approves Price Decontrol For Natural Gas, Wall St. J.,
June 15, 1989 at A2, col. 3.
145. 135 CONG. REC. S3666 (daily ed. April 11, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
However, many of the ceilings are now set above the market price. Only 6% of gas sold in
1988 was effectively controlled. 135 CONG. REC. H1262 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (statement
of Rep. Moorhead).
146. Rosewicz, supra note 144.
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This could amount to as much as 1.6 billion Mcf.'47 By splitting the
difference between the House and Senate bills, Congress forced a sig-
nificant segment of the wellhead market to endure a gradual deregula-
tion. As a result, Congress may have exposed gas producers,
pipelines, and consumers to the same kinds of market distortions they
suffered under the NGPA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many critics expected the NGPA to make a complete shambles
of the natural gas market. Although some of their predictions were
accurate, such as the premature abandonment of old gas wells and the
prolonging of market distortions, 48 most of their worries were un-
founded. However, while almost all the critics called for increased
regulation to solve the expected problems, 49 FERC solved them by
removing some of the regulations that remained.5 0 The gradual de-
regulation of the NGPA was intended to deregulate the wellhead gas
market in a way not too burdensome to residential consumers. 15 1
However, the result of this gradual deregulation was that it caused the
take-or-pay contracts to produce the "bubble."' 52 The Natural Gas
Wellhead Decontrol Act decontrols gas in a gradual manner similar
to the NGPA.
153
It is unfortunate that the House version of the Decontrol Act
was not enacted as originally drafted. Although oil prices have been
fairly stable recently, it is impossible to predict whether or not the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will become
more unified and raise oil prices or become less disciplined and allow
prices to drop.5 4 If oil prices increase, then gas demand will increase
147. The vast majority of gas is sold under some sort of contract. Crump, supra note 1, at
63; Harrison and Formby, supra note 1, at 61; Pierce, supra note 1, at 77. Since the amount of
gas not under any contractual obligation during any single day is likely to be small, most of the
gas to be regulated immediately under the House version of the Decontrol Act would be from
wells drilled after the date of enactment.
About 6.45 billion Mcf was controlled in 1988. H.R. REP. No. 29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1989). The Wall Street Journal expects 25% of this amount, or 1.6 billion Mcf, to be
deregulated immediately. Rosewicz, supra note 144.
148. Pierce, supra note 1, at 90-92.
149. See supra note 109, and accompanying text.
150. Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168.
151. H.R. REP. No. 5289, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1978); MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 824.
152. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
153. Rosewicz, supra note 144. Of course, the effects of this gradual deregulation will
probably be less severe due to the shorter time period.
154. In early June 1989, OPEC reached an agreement on lowering quotas. Kuwait's Vow to
Cut Output Spurs a Rally in Oil Prices, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1989 at 45, col. 1. However,
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and any remaining gas ceilings could lead to shortages similar to those
which occurred in the 1970s. If oil prices decrease, then gas demand
will decrease and a repeat of the "bubble" of the 1980s is likely. As
long as any wellhead price regulation exists, the natural gas industry
will be vulnerable to these kinds of market distortions. 5
The drafting of the Decontrol Act was the result of a political
compromise. The history of natural gas regulation is replete with
political compromises that eventually hurt the gas industry or con-
sumers. 156 Congress, in refusing to learn from history, may have
doomed the natural gas industry by repeating past mistakes. Alfred
Kahn, in discussing the dismantling of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
said that a short transition from regulation to free market is desirable
in order to limit the distortions of the transition. 15 7 By ignoring this
wisdom and by ignoring our experience under the NGPA in the early
1980s, we may have condemned the natural gas industry and its con-
sumers to suffer these distortions for another two years.
almost immediately after the agreement, Kuwait said it had no intention of staying within its
quota, although it would still limit its production. Tanner, Kuwait Pledges to Cut Its Oil Out-
put, Which May Strengthen OPEC, Wall St. J., June 9, 1989, at A2, col. 5; Lower Oil Prices
Seen as Kuwait Defies OPEC, Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 5. It is very
difficult to predict what OPEC will do, or what effect its actions will have on oil prices, in the
near future. It is even more difficult to predict the actions of OPEC from today to 1993. (See
also Solomon, Crude Oil Futures Prices Plunge as Likelihood Of a Strike in the British North
Sea Diminishes, Wall St. J., July 7, 1989, at C13, col. 1 (discussing the wild fluctuations in oil
prices resulting from a threatened strike by British oil workers)).
155. Since the controls would not persist on the entire gas market, the distortions would
not be as severe as they were in the 1970s or 1980s. However, controls on 1.6 billion Mcf
would probably still have a significant impact on the market. See supra note 144.
156. Pierce, supra note 1, at 113-14.
157. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12
(1979).
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